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ABSTRACT
Section 1123(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code permits chapter 11
debtors to retain claims and interests post-confirmation through the
plan of reorganization. This section promotes the maximization of
the bankruptcy estate, which in turn increases distributions to
creditors. While plan confirmation under § 1141 typically has a res
judicata effect, binding all parties and blocking potential causes of
action, § 1123(b)(3)(B) provides an exception. The broad language
of § 1123(b)(3)(B), however, provides minimal guidance as to how
specific reservations must be in order to successfully retain causes of
action. Courts fluctuate between allowing extremely broad claims
reservations and requiring either categorical reservations or the
explicit reservation of individual claims. Courts have even
considered the sufficiency of claims reservations contained in
disclosure statements, including when the reservations are not
necessarily addressed in the plan. This Note analyzes the various
methods courts employ in the application of § 1123(b)(3)(B), and it
proposes a compromise that promotes both the finality of plan
confirmation as well as the maximization of the bankruptcy estate.
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INTRODUCTION
Congress designed chapter 11 bankruptcy to enable a business to
restructure itself so that it might continue to operate in its normal course
despite present or impending insolvency. 1 Chapter 11 balances the
countervailing interests of debtors and creditors by allowing debtors to
reorganize their businesses, while simultaneously repaying their debts

1. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6179 (“The purpose of a business reorganization case . . . is to restructure a
business’s finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs,
pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders. The premise of a business
reorganization is that assets that are used for production in the industry for which they
were designed are more valuable than those same assets sold for scrap.”).
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by providing reasonable distributions to their creditors. 2 It seeks to
maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate by providing a mechanism
for debtors to form new contractual relationships with creditors—
relationships that endure after the debtor emerges from bankruptcy—
through the plan of reorganization.3 If successful, chapter 11 permits a
business to discharge its debts 4 and emerge from bankruptcy,
rehabilitated and able to continue as a going concern.5
As chapter 11 practice has evolved, businesses have increasingly
used its provisions as restructuring tools prior to actual insolvency.6 As
2. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 51 (2008);
see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 775, 776 (1964).
3. Peter C. Blain, Michael D. Jankowski & Bret M. Harper, State Law Offers an
Alternative to Chapter 11, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 29, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/
PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202475325560&State_law_offers_an_alternative_to_Chapter_
11.
4. See Chapter 11: Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Code, UNITED STATES
COURTS, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy
/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter11.aspx (“Section 1141(d)(1) generally provides that
confirmation of a plan discharges a debtor from any debt that arose before the date of
confirmation. After the plan is confirmed, the debtor is required to make plan payments
and is bound by the provisions of the plan of reorganization. The confirmed plan creates
new contractual rights, replacing or superseding pre-bankruptcy contracts.”).
5. See N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984) (“[T]he policy
of chapter 11 is to permit successful rehabilitation of debtors.”); see also Christopher R.
Kaup & J. Daryl Dorsey, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy: A Primer, 28 GPSolo 5 (2011),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/gp_solo/2011/july_august/
chapter_11_bankruptcy_primer.html. Ultimately, chapter 11 provides businesses with
an alternative to chapter 7 liquidation. Chapter 7 provides for the liquidation of the
debtor’s assets and the distribution of the proceeds to the creditors, whereas chapter 11
allows for the rehabilitation of a financially distressed debtor. Donald Lee Rome, The
New Bankruptcy Act and the Commercial Lender, 96 BANKING L.J. 389, 390 (1979).
Management generally enters into chapter 11 cases with the desire to revitalize their
business, through plan confirmation and the repayment of creditors. Information for
Prospective Creditor Committee Members on Chapter 11 Cases, THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, available at http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/private_trustee/
library/chapter11/docs/credcom.pdf. Where a firm has a large number of secured
creditors, chapter 11 may provide greater efficiency, while also enabling the firm to
successfully reorganize and emerge from bankruptcy. Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch & Ning
Zhu, The Costs of Bankruptcy:
Chapter 7 Liquidation Versus Chapter 11
Reorganization, 61 J. FIN. 1253, 1261 (2006).
6. Corporations use bankruptcy as a means to restructure their finances for a
variety of operational reasons. Chapter 11 provides a means for debtors to reorganize
their businesses by selling off money-losing divisions or readjusting the debt levels of
an otherwise operationally sound business. See ELIZABETH WARREN, Chapter 11:
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such, businesses often enter bankruptcy with a plan already in place,
allowing bankruptcy proceedings to progress rapidly in order to expedite
the rehabilitation of the debtor. 7 Financially distressed businesses 8
endeavor to settle their debts and emerge from chapter 11 as quickly as
possible. 9 Plans of reorganization provide the means through which
debtors may discharge their debts and resume their respective business
activities. Through plan confirmation, debtors effectively bind the
estate10 while also improving their potential for success post-filing.11 As
such, it is crucial that courts aggressively seek to maximize the
bankruptcy estate prior to plan confirmation in order to ensure its
finality.12
REORGANIZING AMERICAN BUSINESSES 4–5 (2008). Chapter 11 does not explicitly
require insolvency prior to bankruptcy, and companies may file a bankruptcy petition
under this chapter when facing tort liabilities, adverse outcomes in litigation, or in
anticipation of liquidity issues. See JONES DAY, COMPARISON OF CHAPTER 11 OF THE
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY CODE WITH THE SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATION IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM, THE RESCUE PROCEDURE IN FRANCE, INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS IN
GERMANY, AND EXTRAORDINARY ADMINISTRATION FOR LARGE INSOLVENT COMPANIES
IN ITALY 49, 51 (2007), available at http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication
/1ec093d4-66fb-42a6-8115be0694c59443/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/
e5b46572-7aeb-4c34-ab2e bee2f8f3d3c2/Comparison%20of%20Chapter%2011%20
(A4).pdf.
7. Gerald P. Buccino & Steven M. Golub, Reflecting on Business Bankruptcies
from the Pre-Code Era into the New Millennium, 18-JAN AM. BANKR. INST. J. 36, 37
(Jan. 2000) (“[T]ransaction-minded professionals began to view chapter 11 as a means
for rapidly effectuating a financial restructuring, similar to an exchange offer outside
the bankruptcy context.”).
8. See sources cited supra note 6, discussing the sources of financial distress
which may encourage a solvent business to file for bankruptcy.
9. Michelle Campbell & Todd Brents, Expedited Chapter 11s: Case
Administration Workplan and Key Considerations, 29-OCT AM. BANKR. INST. J. 24, 76
(Oct. 2010).
10. See Eubanks v. F.D.I.C., 977 F.2d 166, 170–71 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that
plan confirmation is res judicata and binding upon all parties that might have a claim or
interest against the estate).
11. See Anne Lawton, Chapter 11 Triage: Diagnosing A Debtor’s Prospects for
Success 15 (Mar. 7, 2012), available at http://works.bepress.com/anne_lawton/1 (“A
traditional measure of success is the emergence of a debtor from chapter 11 with a
feasible plan.”). Under this study, plan confirmation was analyzed as a measure of
success of chapter 11 cases, and only one third of the studied cases met this criteria to
qualify as successful. Id. at 17.
12. See infra Part I.A. Although plan confirmation generally binds the estate,
following confirmation, courts retain the authority to “issue any other order necessary
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Filing a chapter 11 petition commences a bankruptcy case, which
creates a bankruptcy estate.13 Congress intended the bankruptcy estate
to include an expansive range of property and interests.14 The current
Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”)15 greatly expanded the types of property
within the scope of the estate and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of
bankruptcy courts. 16 Successful reorganization requires that the
bankruptcy estate be broad in order to account for all creditors’ claims
as well as the implicit costs of chapter 11.17 The ability of a debtor to
effectively fulfill its obligations in bankruptcy necessarily depends on
the assets available to the estate.18 To this end, the bankruptcy estate
includes both the available assets of the debtor as well as those claims of
the debtor that existed prior to filing.19 Various provisions of the Code

to administer the estate.” FED. R. BANKR. P. 3020(d); see 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(ii)
(2012) (requiring that in a plan of reorganization, holders of impaired claims receive at
least as much as they would if the debtor had rather liquidated under chapter 7).
13. Westmoreland Human Opportunities, Inc. v. Walsh, 246 F.3d 233, 241 (3d Cir.
2001) (describing the breadth of the bankruptcy estate and how it comes into existence).
14. See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 204 (1983) (“Both the
congressional goal of encouraging reorganizations and Congress’ choice of methods to
protect secured creditors suggest that Congress intended a broad range of property to be
included in the estate.”).
15. Title 11 of the United States Codes contains the relevant bankruptcy provision,
and all references to Code provisions will refer to Title 11 unless otherwise noted.
16. Lee R. Bogdanoff, The Purchase and Sale of Assets in Reorganization Cases—
of Interest and Principal, of Principles and Interests, 47 BUS. LAW. 1367, 1373–74
(1992). The Code significantly expanded the types of property to be included in the
estate from the very limited provisions contained in the prior Bankruptcy Act. Id. The
Code further broadened the scope of the bankruptcy estate by expanding bankruptcy
courts’ jurisdiction beyond the confines of property within the debtor’s possession at
the time of filing. Id. at 1376.
17. 11 U.S.C. § 1129. Chapter 11 entails fees and expenses which frequently reach
exceedingly high numbers. See Nancy B. Rapoport, The Case for Value Billing in
Chapter 11, 7 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 117, 119 (2012) (“Professional fees are big business,
especially in large chapter 11 cases.”).
18. See Douglas Baird, Arturo Bris & Ning Zhu, The Dynamics of Large and Small
chapter 11 Cases:
An Empirical Study 4–10 (2005), available at
http://faculty.gsm.ucdavis.edu/~nzhu/papers/priority.pdf (explaining how distributions
of estate assets are divided amongst the various classes of creditors in chapter 11 cases).
19. In re FitzSimmons, 725 F.2d 1208, 1210 (9th Cir. 1984) (“The scope of the
estate is broad: it includes, with two minor exceptions, ‘all legal or equitable interests of
the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.’”) (quoting 11 U.S.C. §
541(a)(1)). The scope of the bankruptcy estate extends to those current interests and
property owned by the debtor, as well as all other interests, regardless of their
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provide a statutory basis to ensure this maximization of the estate. 20
Broadly, chapter 11 endeavors to ensure that the commencement of the
case preserves, rather than diminishes, the assets available for
distribution to creditors. 21 Accordingly, at commencement, § 362
automatically stays all actions against the estate at the filing of the order
for relief.22 Section 541(a)(1) then provides that the bankruptcy estate
includes “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of
the commencement of the case.”23 The estate formed encompasses all of
the debtor’s claims against others, as well as the debtor’s interests in
property, whether they are full ownership, merely possessory, or even in
the custody of third parties.24 Sections 362 and 541 operate in tandem to
aggregate estate property by protecting it from piecemeal dismantling by
creditors and by providing for the most inclusive estate.25
Section 1123(b)(3)(B) builds upon these sections to further include
those claims of the debtor existing prior to the filing of the bankruptcy
petition as estate property. 26 This provision implicates traditional
aspects of litigation such as notice 27 and res judicata. 28
Section
1123(b)(3)(B) provides a potential exception to the binding nature of

conditional, future, speculative or equitable nature. See In re Anders, 151 B.R. 543, 545
(Bankr. D. Nev. 1993).
20. See 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (“Except as provided in section 1161 of this title,
chapters 1, 3, and 5 of this title apply in a case under chapter 7, 11, 12, or 13 of this
title.”).
21. Bogdanoff, supra note 16, at 1375.
22. 11 U.S.C. § 362.
23. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) .
24. WARREN, supra note 6, at 39.
25. 5 ALAN N. RESNICK & HENRY J. SOMMER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 541.01,
at 541.01–.10 (16th ed. 2013).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B).
27. Allowing or disallowing the retention of claims under section 1123(b)(3)(B)
can have serious implications for impacted creditors, requiring sufficient notice. See
Ralph E. Avery, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy and Principles of Res Judicata, 102 COM. L.J.
257, 280 (1997) (“Formal notice or actual knowledge of specific important events in the
reorganization process is necessary to foreclose claimants whose identity is known to or
reasonably ascertainable by the debtor.”); see also Spicer v. Laguna Madre Oil & Gas
II, LLC (In re Tex. Wyo. Drilling, Inc.), 422 B.R. 612, 625 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010),
aff’d, 647 F.3d (5th Cir. 2011) (“[C]reditors must be able to view a proposed plan and
properly evaluate the creditors’ benefits and potential liabilities . . . .”).
28. See infra Part I.
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plan confirmation to ensure the maximum retention of estate property
through plan confirmation.29
Maximizing the bankruptcy estate serves the interests of both
creditors and debtors. Chapter 11 reorganizations are structured to
enhance the ability of creditors and equity holders to recover value from
a bankrupt enterprise.30 Increasing the available funds helps ensure that
creditors can receive a reasonable return and enhances the potential for
the successful restructuring and rehabilitation of the debtor.31 Chapter
11 ultimately provides businesses with an opportunity to survive by
putting the success of the entire group—including the debtor, the
debtor’s employees, creditors, and other interested parties—above the
rights of individual creditors.32
This Note examines the role that plan confirmation plays in
defining the scope of assets to be included in commercial chapter 11
bankruptcy estates, with particular reference to claim retention under §
1123(b)(3)(B). Part I analyzes the effects of res judicata and provides a
contextual basis for requiring finality in the confirmation of chapter 11
plans of reorganization. It reviews the background and provides a
substantive overview of the statutory requirements of plan confirmation.
Part I then identifies the role that § 1123(b)(3)(B) serves within this
statutory scheme to promote the general purposes of chapter 11. Part II
provides an analysis of the competing ways in which courts interpret
and apply § 1123(b)(3)(B).
It examines how courts apply §
1123(b)(3)(B) in determining whether or not plans successfully retain
claims and the rationale behind these decisions. Part II also considers
whether claims may be successfully retained throughdisclosure
statements. Finally, Part III discusses the potential weaknesses of
requiring explicit reservations of claims. It suggests a method for
allowing general categorical reservations of claims, while still providing
a reasonable level of certainty to creditors and potential defendants of
claims retained post-confirmation.
I. THE DISCRETIONARY PROVISION FOR CLAIM RETENTION UNDER §
1123(B)(3)(B): AN EXCEPTION TO THE RES JUDICATA EFFECT OF
29.
30.
31.

See infra Part I.A.2.
Bogdanoff, supra note 16, at 1369.
See Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 51 (2008)
(“Chapter 11 strikes a balance between a debtor’s interest in reorganizing and
restructuring its debts and the creditors’ interest in maximizing the value of the
bankruptcy estate.”).
32. WARREN, supra note 6, at 15–16.
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PLAN CONFIRMATION
The policy behind res judicata is to avoid the “cost and vexation” of
duplicative litigation.33 The general design and purpose of bankruptcy
serves similar purposes, providing a fresh start, which releases both the
debtor and the interested parties from pre-petition debts and
obligations. 34 Under chapter 11, corporate debtors realize the res
judicata effects of bankruptcy through the discharge represented by plan
confirmation.35
A. CONFIRMATION OF A PLAN OF REORGANIZATION UNDER § 1141
A successful chapter 11 case culminates with the confirmation of a
plan of reorganization under § 1141. 36 Plan confirmation generally
provides the effects of res judicata in the bankruptcy context, though §
1123(b)(3)(B) functions as an exception. 37 Section 1123(b)(3)(B)
enables debtors to continue maximizing the value of the estate beyond
plan confirmation through the retention of claims.38
1. The Res Judicata Effect of Plan Confirmation
The doctrine of res judicata has traditionally received great
deference from courts. 39 Res judicata specifically refers to claim
33. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (“[R]es judicata . . . relieve(s) parties
of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve(s) judicial resources, and, by
preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage(s) reliance on adjudication.”).
34. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (noting that the discharge of
indebtedness and debtor’s fresh start are primary purposes of bankruptcy).
35. See Eubanks v. F.D.I.C., 977 F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir. 1992) (“It has long been
recognized that a bankruptcy court’s order confirming a plan of reorganization is given
the same effect as a district court’s judgment on the merits for claim preclusion
purposes.”).
36. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
37. See infra Part I.A.2.
38. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981)
(“The doctrine of res judicata serves vital public interests beyond any individual judge’s
ad hoc determination of the equities in a particular case.”); Heiser v. Woodruff, 327
U.S. 726, 733 (1946) (“[W]e are aware of no principle of law or equity which sanctions
the rejection by a federal court of the salutary principle of res judicata, which is
founded upon the generally recognized public policy that there must be some end to
litigation . . . .”); Hart Steel Co. v. R.R. Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294, 299 (1917) (stating
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preclusion, though courts have extended its application to include issue
preclusion as well.40 As a general matter, the Supreme Court has long
held that res judicata precludes the future litigation of claims that have
received binding resolutions. 41 More broadly, the basic policies
underlying res judicata preclude the re-litigation of matters and permit
courts to foreclose subsequent litigation on matters that were never
actually litigated, but that should have been advanced in a prior suit.42
Res judicata in essence provides finality to all interested parties.
The statutory goal of every chapter 11 bankruptcy case is the
confirmation of a plan of reorganization. 43 Courts have substantial
discretion in approving chapter 11 plans of reorganization, however,
each plan must comply with the statutory requirements of the Code.44

that res judicata is “a rule of fundamental and substantial justice, ‘of public policy and
of private peace,’ which should be cordially regarded and enforced by the courts”)
(citation omitted).
40. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (“The preclusive effect of a
judgment is defined by claim preclusion and issue preclusion, which are collectively
referred to as ‘res judicata.’”).
41. See, e.g., Hart Steel Co., 244 U.S. at 299 (“[R]es judicata is not a mere matter
of practice or procedure . . . . It is a rule of fundamental and substantial justice, ‘of
public policy and of private peace,’ which should be cordially regarded and enforced by
the courts . . . .”) (citation omitted); Moitie, 452 U.S. at 398 (“A final judgment on the
merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that
were or could have been raised in that action.”).
42. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979) (“Res judicata prevents litigation of
all grounds for, or defenses to, recovery that were previously available to the parties,
regardless of whether they were asserted or determined in the prior proceeding.”); see
Barnett v. Stern, 909 F.2d 973, 978 (7th Cir. 1990) (explaining res judicata is applied
where the prior and present litigation share “(1) an identity of the parties or their
privies; (2) an identity of causes of action; and (3) a final judgment on the merits in the
prior litigation”); see generally, 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4403 (2d ed. 1987) (discussing the background
and purpose of the rules of res judicata).
43. 7 ALAN N. RESNICK & HENRY J. SOMMER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.01
(16th ed. 2013) (“Section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code provides the requirements for
such confirmation, containing Congress’ minimum requirements for allowing an entity
to discharge its unpaid debts and continue its operations.”); see In re St. James Mech.,
Inc., 434 B.R. 54, 61 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Confirmation of a debtor’s plan of
reorganization is the seminal event in the chapter 11 bankruptcy process.”).
44. W. HOMER DRAKE, JR. & CHRISTOPHER S. STRICKLAND, CHAPTER 11
REORGANIZATIONS § 1:1 (2d ed. 2012). Bankruptcy courts have the power and
discretion to confirm plans of reorganization where they meet the general framework
provided for in the bankruptcy code and are “acceptable and beneficial to a majority of

240

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XIX

Section 1129(a)(11) lays out a feasibility standard, which requires that a
plan of reorganization provide “reasonable assurance, probability or
prospect of success.”45 Implicit within this standard is the requirement
that the plan provide a method for the estate to satisfy claims made by
creditors, as a plan cannot otherwise satisfy the section’s basic terms.46
If a plan of reorganization meets all of the confirmation
requirements carefully drawn out in § 1129,47 then § 1141(a) binds all
parties to its terms with preclusive effect. 48 For the purposes of res
judicata, the confirmation of a plan of reorganization is analogous to a
final decision on the merits.49 While § 1141 is narrowly drafted, it has
the effect of binding all parties under the plan upon confirmation. 50
Thus, all issues pertaining to the plan that could have been raised prior
to confirmation are res judicata.51
creditors . . . [that] may have a substantial voice in the ultimate plan that gains judicial
approval.” Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121–1129 (2012)).
45. BANKRUPTCY SERVICE, LAWYERS EDITION § 45:231 (2013). Section 1129(11)
allows a court to confirm a plan only if it is not likely that confirmation will be
followed by the debtor’s liquidation, or “the need for further financial reorganization, of
the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan, unless such liquidation or
reorganization is proposed in the plan.” 11 U.S.C. § 1129. The feasibility standard does
not require that the plan of reorganization guarantee success, it simply requires that it
offer a reasonable assurance of success. Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re JohnsManville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636, 649 (2d Cir. 1988).
46. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9); see also supra note 45. If a plan cannot provide
for the repayment of claims made against it, than its success is not reasonably assured.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
47. 11 U.S.C. § 1129.
48. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (“[T]he provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor,
any entity issuing securities under the plan, any entity acquiring property under the
plan, and any creditor, equity security holder, or general partner in the debtor.”). The
only exceptions to section 1141(a), found in (d)(2) and (d)(3), do not relate to section
1123(b)(3)(B) claim retention. 11 U.S.C. § 1141; see Fleet Nat’l Bank v. Gray (In re
Bankvest Capital Corp.), 375 F.3d 51, 58 (1st Cir. 2004) (“Pursuant to Section 1141 of
the Bankruptcy Code, the confirmation of a plan of reorganization . . . precludes parties
from raising claims or issues that could have or should have been raised before
confirmation but were not.”).
49. Eubanks v. F.D.I.C., 977 F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir. 1992) (“It has long been
recognized that a bankruptcy court’s order confirming a plan of reorganization is given
the same effect as a district court’s judgment on the merits for claim preclusion
purposes.”).
50. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
51. See 5 ALAN N. RESNICK & HENRY J. SOMMER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶
1141.02 (16th ed. 2013) (stating that a confirmed plan binds “every entity that holds a

2013]

BROADENING THE ESTATE—§ 1123(B)(3)(B)

241

Plan confirmation provides a method of recovery for creditors,52
while discharging the debtor from all debts that arose prior to plan
confirmation. 53 Accordingly, this res judicata effect extends to all
causes of action that became assets of the estate. 54 This finality,
obtained through the confirmation of the plan of reorganization,
reinforces the fundamental purpose of chapter 11 to rehabilitate troubled
enterprises and discharge their debts.55
2. An Exception to Res Judicata in Bankruptcy
While res judicata reaches all areas of jurisprudence, including
bankruptcy, there are certain exceptions. In 1979, the Supreme Court
refused to apply res judicata in a bankruptcy case where the questions
were not precisely at issue in previous litigation and were matters that
Congress intended bankruptcy courts to resolve. 56 The Bankruptcy
Code and Rules “balance the policies represented by res judicata against
the need for the process of reorganization to be flexible enough to
accommodate the vagaries of business operations” in chapter 11 cases.57
claim or interest even though [it] is not scheduled, has not filed a claim, does not
receive a distribution under the plan, or is not entitled to retain an interest under such
plan”).
52. See Rosemary E. Williams, Confirmation of Plan of Reorganization by
Business Entity Under Section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code, 94 AM. JUR. Proof of
Facts 3d 1, I. §2 (2013) (stating that the purpose of a plan, as viewed by creditors, is “to
distribute the assets of a debtor entity to creditors in full satisfaction (although not often
in full payment) of the prepetition debts of and interests in the debtor entity”).
53. 11 U.S.C. § 1141.
54. See Elk Horn Coal Co. v. Conveyor Mfg. & Supply, Inc. (In re Pen Holdings,
Inc.), 316 B.R. 495, 498 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2004).
55. Mark G. Douglas, Unscrambling the Egg or Redividing the Pie? Revoking a
Chapter 11 Plan Confirmation Order, J. BANKR. L. 2006.10-5 (2006); see Retired
Pilots Ass’n of U.S. Airways, Inc. v. US Airways Grp., Inc. (In re US Airways Grp.,
Inc.), 369 F.3d 806, 810 (4th Cir. 2004) (explaining that parties rely on plans of
reorganization once a confirmation order has been consummated).
56. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 138 (1979) (finding an exception to res judicata
where a debt was previously reduced to judgment in state court, but allowing new
evidence to be submitted in front of the bankruptcy court where “neither the interests
served by res judicata . . . nor the policies of the Bankruptcy Act would be well served
by foreclosing” its submission).
57. Avery, supra note 27, at 258. To view chapter 11 cases as litigation, they must
at least be viewed as nontraditional litigation because they involve both the resolution
of past events as well as a “resolution capable of accommodating future events and the
shifting interests of a multiplicity of parties.” Id.
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Although plan confirmation functions as a final judgment on the merits
with regards to matters addressed in the plan of reorganization, 58 §
1123(b)(3)(B) provides for a statutory exception to the binding nature of
plan confirmation on preexisting claims.59
Section 1123 of the Code provides a broad overview of the contents
of a plan of reorganization. More specifically, § 1123(b)(3)(B) provides
debtors—or their representatives—with standing to bring claims that the
debtor reserves in the plan, but not those that have not been so
reserved.60 This section states that a chapter 11 plan of reorganization
may provide for “the retention and enforcement by the debtor, by the
trustee, or by a representative of the estate appointed for such purpose,
of any . . . claim or interest”61 belonging to the debtor or the estate.62
Generally, the estate of the debtor ceases to exist after plan
confirmation, which then terminates the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court. 63 Section 1123(b)(3)(B), however, provides an opportunity for
the continued maximization of estate assets post-confirmation.64
58. See supra notes 48-49; see also Cohen v. TIC Fin. Sys. (In re Ampace Corp.),
279 B.R. 145, 155 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002).
59. Robert C. Folland & Andrew L. Turscak, Jr., Preserving Estate Claims PostConfirmation: A Need for Uniformity from the Circuit Courts, 27-MAR AM. BANKR.
INST. J. 14, 75 (2008). Res judicata applies to all areas of jurisprudence, but as applied
to bankruptcy, “even where a claim would otherwise be barred by res judicata, Code
§1123(b)(3)(B) may offer the plaintiff an escape hatch,” allowing for the retention of
any claim or interest. Id.
60. Compton v. Anderson (In re MPF Holdings US LLC), 701 F.3d 449, 454 (5th
Cir. 2012).
61. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B) (2012); see MPF Holdings, 701 F.3d at 453
(“Section 1123(b)(3) . . . allows a debtor to retain causes of action possessed by the
bankruptcy estate by providing for the retention of such claims in its reorganization
plan.”).
62. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(A) (allowing for “the settlement or adjustment of any
claim or interest belonging to the debtor or to the estate”).
63. Norwest Equip. Fin., Inc. v. Nath (In re D & P P’ship), 91 F.3d 1072, 1074 (8th
Cir. 1996). Although the estate may technically cease to exist following plan
confirmation, “the debtor remains a debtor until the [T]itle 11 case has been closed
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 350(a), and the bankruptcy court normally retains jurisdiction.”
Joseph J. Wielebinski & J. David Leamon, Post-Confirmation Issues: How To Fix
What You Did Not Fix at Confirmation, BUS. BANKR. COURSE 1, 2 (2003), available at
http://www.munsch.com/files/1117724_1.pdf.
64. See 11 U.S.C. 1123(b)(3)(B); see also Spicer v. Laguna Madre Oil & Gas II,
LLC (In re Tex. Wyo. Drilling, Inc.), 647 F.3d 547, 552 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[A]fter
confirmation of a plan, the ability of the debtor to enforce a claim once held by the
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Counter to the general policy behind res judicata, chapter 11 risks
abandoning claims that have not actually received a final adjudication,
outside that finality which plan confirmation provides. 65 Potential
defendants and courts may carefully scrutinize the explicit language of
the plan of reorganization and the disclosure statement in order to use
res judicata as a defense to pursuing causes of action postconfirmation. 66 While § 1123(b)(3)(B) may benefit debtors and/or
creditors as a class by allowing for the reservation of certain claims, it
also benefits the potential defendants of reserved claims by providing
notice.67
B. CLAIM RETENTION UNDER § 1123(B)(3)(B)
The language of § 1123(b) establishes what a plan may contain,
which is in contrast to the language of § 1123(a), which establishes what
a plan must contain. 68 Section 1123(b), however, operates subject to
subsection (a). While § 1123(b)(3)(B) provides the general framework
under which pre-existing claims may be retained as estate property,69 it
is §1123(a)(5)(A) that requires a plan of reorganization adequately
provides for the plan’s implementation, such as through the “retention
by the debtor of all or any of the property of the estate.”70
1. The Purpose and Method Behind Retaining Claims
Section 1123(b)(3)(B) allows debtors to retain causes of action to
pursue post plan confirmation. 71 It explicitly provides that any such
claims or interests of the debtor, or the estate, may be retained through
the plan of reorganization,72 and it further leaves open the possibility for
estate is limited to that which has been retained in the [bankruptcy] plan.”) (citing 11
U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B)).
65. See Eubanks v. F.D.I.C., 977 F.2d 166, 170–71 (5th Cir. 1992).
66. Wielebinski & Leamon, supra note 63, at 8.
67. Harstad v. First Am. Bank, 39 F.3d 898, 903 (8th Cir.1994).
68. COLLIER PAMPHLET EDITION, BANKRUPTCY CODE PART I 896 (Alan N. Resnick
& Henry J. Sommer eds., 2013) [hereinafter COLLIER PAMPHLET PART I]; see Cohen v.
TIC Fin. Sys. (In re Ampace Corp.), 279 B.R. 145, 158 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002)
(“[Section] 1123 distinguishes between what a plan must include and what a plan may
include.”).
69. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B) (2012).
70. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(A).
71. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B).
72. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3).
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claims to be retained in the disclosure statement. 73 It is, however,
unclear how explicit the claim reservation must be to be enforceable.74
Notice requirements represent a fundamental aspect of due
process, 75 and notice underlies many aspects of bankruptcy case
administration. 76 The required disclosure of retained claims notifies
creditors and potential defendants regarding causes of action the debtor
intends to pursue post-confirmation. 77 Creditors may rely on the
reservations made under § 1123(b)(3)(B) when evaluating potential
distributions available under a proposed chapter 11 plan.78 Additionally,
those creditors who might be defendants may also rely on such
reservations to determine both their potential distributions as well as
their potential liabilities. 79 This notice requirement benefits both the
73. See infra Part II.C., see also 11 U.S.C. § 1125. Courts have broad discretion to
determine the adequacy of information contained in disclosure statements. S. REP. NO.
95-989, at 120 (1978). Section 1125 governs the content of post-petition disclosure
according to the specific case circumstances; its legislative notes provide that courts
have judicial discretion regarding the content of disclosure statements, as long as it is
“of a kind and in sufficient detail that a reasonable and typical investor can make an
informed judgment about the plan.” Id. at 120-122.
74. See infra Part II.
75. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). At a
minimum, due process requires that “deprivation of life, liberty or property by
adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature
of the case.” Id.
76. See 11 U.S.C. § 342(a) (“There shall be given such notice as is appropriate,
including notice to any holder of a community claim, of an order for relief in a case
under this title.”).
77. Where a disclosure statement lists a party the debtor intends to bring an
adversary proceeding against, proper notice may be a substantial component in the
court’s determination of whether or not the claim may be pursued. See Steel Drum Co.
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co (In re Goodman Bros. Steel Drum Co.), 247 B.R. 604, 608
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2000). The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy specifically require
creditors and parties in interest receive a certain level of notice regarding the
consideration of the disclosure statement and confirmation of the plan of
reorganization. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3017. As such, section 1123(b)(3)(B) has been
described as “fundamentally a notice provision.” In re Bleu Room Experience, Inc., 304
B.R. 309, 314 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2004).
78. See Spicer v. Laguna Madre Oil & Gas II, LLC (In re Tex. Wyo. Drilling,
Inc.), 422 B.R. 612, 625 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010), aff’d, 647 F.3d (5th Cir. 2011)
(“[C]reditors must be able to view a proposed plan and properly evaluate the creditors’
benefits and potential liabilities . . . .”).
79. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Crowley, Milner & Co. v. Callahan
(In re Crowley, Milner & Co.), 299 B.R. 830, 851 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2003).
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estate’s creditors as a collective body, as well as the individual potential
defendants.80 Debtors must comply with the statutory requirements of §
1123(b)(3)(B)—giving general notice of the debtors’ intention to retain
claims under the provision—because creditors are unable to seek their
fair share of the recovery without sufficient notice of available assets.81
Section 1123’s legislative history provides a background for its
general purpose, but it provides only minimal guidance regarding what
level of disclosure is sufficient to successfully retain claims. 82 While
some courts permit general blanket, or categorical reservations of
claims, other courts require a more demanding, specific and unequivocal
reservation. 83 Due to the absence of a clear standard regarding how
80. Compare Kmart Corp. v. Intercraft Co. (In re Kmart Corp.), 310 B.R. 107, 120
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004) (“The disclosure and notice afforded by a section 1123(b)(3)
retention provision, however, is directed towards the estate’s creditors, not the potential
defendants on the reserved claims.”) and Elk Horn Coal Co. v. Conveyor Mfg. &
Supply, Inc. (In re Pen Holdings, Inc.), 316 B.R. 495, 501 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2004)
(“[I]t is notice to creditors generally that there are assets yet to be liquidated that are
being preserved for prosecution by the reorganized debtor or its designee.”), with
Harstad v. First Am. Bank, 39 F.3d 898, 903 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Creditors have the right
to know of any potential causes of action that might enlarge the estate—and that could
be used to increase payment to the creditors.”) and P.A. Bergner & Co. v. Bank One,
Milwaukee, N.A. (In re P.A. Bergner & Co.), 140 F.3d 1111, 1117 (7th Cir. 1998)
(allowing a retained claim to remain partly on the basis that the defendant had sufficient
notice).
81. Harstad, 39 F.3d at 903.
82. DENNIS J. CONNOLLY, DAVID A. LANDER, & TIMOTHY M. LUPINACCI, 2012
NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW SEMINAR MATERIALS: PREFERENCE LITIGATION 80 (2012),
available at http://www.nortoninstitutes.org/2012SeminarMaterials/12-Preference
Litigation/M12-PreferenceLitigationTOC.html.
The legislative history notes that
section 1123 was derived from the former section 216 of chapter X of the Bankruptcy
Act. Id. The legislative history of section 216 simply indicates that “its aim was to
make possible the formulation and consummation of a plan before completion of the
investigation and prosecution of causes of action.” Id. (citing Pen Holdings, 316 B.R. at
499) (internal quotations omitted). Congress adopted chapter X to provide increased
protection to creditors and enhance their ability to participate in corporate
reorganization proceedings, and subsequently, “[p]reservation of a debtor’s causes of
action for the benefit of creditors was the goal of the liberalization of language in
1978.” Pen Holdings, 316 B.R. at 499–500.
83. At the 86th Annual National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, practitioners
discussed the relative requirements for preserving causes of action under section
1123(b)(3)(B), as well as the risks and benefits of general, categorical, and specific
reservations. While there seemed to be no clear consensus regarding which method
provided the best chance for successful claim retention, the overall importance of
carefully drafting plan documents was made clear. Jay Horowitz, National Conference
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specific claim retention must be, 84 courts and practitioners must
independently navigate the uncertain language of § 1123(b)(3)(B) to
ensure that claims are properly retained post-confirmation.85
2. Standing to Pursue Retained Claims and the Extent of These Powers
The ability to pursue claims retained under § 1123(b)(3)(B) lies
with either the debtor-in-possession,86 the trustee,87 or a representative88
of Bankruptcy Judges: Individual Ch. 11s, Jurisdiction, Mortgages Are Hot Topics at
Judges’ Conference, 24 BNA BANKR. L. REP. 1420 (2012).
84. In re Bleu Room Experience, Inc., 304 B.R. 309, 314 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
2004).
85. Courts have broad discretion to evaluate section 1123(b)(3)(B) claims as the
provision is “not jurisdictional in nature but rather provides authority for the postconfirmation pursuit of claims.” David R. Hurst, Laurie A. Krepto & Simon E. Fraser,
The Scope of Post-Confirmation Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction, ABI COMM.
NEWSLETTER, 2008, at 13; see Susan E. Trent, Plan Drafting Requirements Pursuant to
S 1123(b)(3)(b) Tackled, 32-FEB AM. BANKR. INST. J. 16, 16 (“The inclusion of
sufficient claims retention language further provides a bankruptcy court with subjectmatter jurisdiction post-confirmation over the preserved pre-confirmation claims.”). As
there is currently no safe-harbor within the various standards applied to section
1123(b)(3)(B), “[p]lan proponents should carefully consider how much disclosure is
enough to preserve causes of action for post-confirmation litigation . . . disclosure will
be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.” Robin Bicket White, Retaining Preference
Actions in Plans of Reorganization - How Much Disclosure is Enough?, FROST,
BROWN, TODD LLC, available at http://www.frostbrowntodd.com/resources-1567.html
(last visited Sept. 13, 2013). Debtors and courts must ultimately balance these
uncertainties as to what is specifically necessary to successfully retain and enforce
claims.
86. 8B C.J.S. Bankruptcy § 1131 (2013) (explaining that a chapter 11 debtor
becomes a debtor-in-possession “once the bankruptcy petition is filed[,] and [it] is an
entity that is legally distinct from the original debtor . . . . [U]nder the Bankruptcy
Code, a debtor in possession has most of the rights, duties, and powers of the chapter 11
trustee”).
87. Pursuant to section 1104, the court shall order the appointment of a trustee “[a]t
any time after the commencement of the case but before confirmation of a plan, on
request of a party in interest or the United States trustee, and after notice and a hearing .
. . .” 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (2012). However, the Code’s ultimate aim is to protect creditors,
thus its policies are flexible, and it is within a court’s discretion to determine if there is
cause to appoint a trustee. Comm. of Dalkon Shield Claimants v. A.H. Robins Co., 828
F.2d 239, 242 (4th Cir. 1987).
88. In order for a party, who is neither the debtor nor the trustee, to be a
representative for the purposes of enforcing a section 1123(b)(3)(B) claim, the party
must establish “(1) that it has been appointed [and] (2) that it is a representative of the
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appointed for such purpose. 89 Debtors-in-possession and trustees
perform the same functions in chapter 11 cases. 90 Insofar as any
representative of the estate exercises his or her powers in dealing with
retained claims, he or she has a fiduciary obligation to ensure both the
successful rehabilitation of the bankruptcy estate and a reasonable return
to creditors.91
Debtors-in-possession have the ability to pursue claims following
the filing of a chapter 11 petition. Unless a trustee is appointed, 92 the
estate.” Retail Mktg. Co. v. King (In re Mako, Inc.), 985 F.2d 1052, 1054 (10th Cir.
1993) (citation omitted).
89. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B) (2012).
90. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery
(In re Cybergenics Corp.), 226 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that because a
debtor-in-possession has the powers and duties of a trustee, “[t]he terms ‘trustee’ and
‘debtor in possession,’ as used in the Bankruptcy Code, are thus essentially
interchangeable”).
91. See e.g., United States v. Aldrich (In re Rigden), 795 F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir.
1986) (holding that a representative of a bankruptcy estate “has a fiduciary obligation to
conserve the assets of the estate and to maximize distribution to creditors” in pursuing
retained claims); Cybergenics Corp., 226 F.3d at 243 (“A paramount duty of a trustee
or debtor in possession in a bankruptcy case is to act on behalf of the bankruptcy estate,
that is, for the benefit of the creditors.”); Mako, Inc., 985 F.2d at 1054 (noting that in
order for a party, who is neither the debtor nor the trustee, to be a representative for the
purposes of enforcing a § 1123(b)(3)(B) claim, the party must establish “(1) that it has
been appointed; [and] (2) that it is a representative of the estate”) (citation omitted).
92. Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc. v. Coolbrands Int’l, Inc. (In re Ice Cream
Liquidation, Inc.), 319 B.R. 324, 333 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2005) (“[I]f no trustee is
appointed, during the chapter 11 case prior to plan confirmation the debtor enjoys the
status of debtor in possession with all the relevant powers of a trustee.”). By allowing
the debtor to become a debtor-in-possession following the filing of the bankruptcy
petition, chapter 11 enables the debtor to retain management and control of the
bankrupt entity’s business operations, barring proof that the appointment of a trustee is
warranted. See 8B C.J.S. Bankruptcy § 1131 (2013); see also In re Adelphia Commc’ns
Corp., 336 B.R. 610, 655 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 342 B.R. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(“[T]here is a strong presumption that the debtor should be permitted to remain in
possession absent a showing of need for the appointment of a trustee.”). Additionally,
chapter 11 reserves to the debtor the exclusive right to file a plan of reorganization for
the first 120 days after filing an order for relief, both allowing the debtor the
opportunity to present a plan that will enable it to emerge from bankruptcy reorganized
and providing an acceptable return to creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b); Karen Gross &
Patricia Redmond, In Defense of Debtor Exclusivity: Assessing Four of the 1994
Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 287, 291 (1995)
(“[E]xclusivity is perceived to encourage rehabilitation by empowering the debtor to
control its own destiny . . . . [Thus] the exclusive right to file a plan can be seen as the
debtor’s chip in the reorganization game.”).
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debtor-in-possession serves as the bankruptcy estate’s legal
representative after the commencement of the case.93 Absent a trustee,
the Code grants a debtor-in-possession many of the rights and powers of
a trustee and permits the debtor-in-possession to perform all of a
trustee’s duties and functions.94 Generally, when a plan is confirmed,
the estate ceases to exist and the debtor’s trustee powers expire because
the debtor-in-possession loses the possession that granted him the ability
to exercise the claims power of a trustee.95 A debtor, however, may still
pursue those claims that have been properly reserved in the plan of
reorganization.96
In a case where a trustee is appointed, the debtor may reserve the
power to pursue claims for the trustee, who will then pursue the claims
following plan confirmation in lieu of the debtor. 97 Under § 323(b),
93. Smart World Techs., LLC v. Juno Online Servs., Inc. (In re Smart World
Techs., LLC), 423 F.3d 166, 174 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he debtor-in-possession’s role [is]
legal representative of the bankruptcy estate, [as] set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 323(a). As
legal representative, the debtor-in-possession has the power to sue and be sued on the
estate’s behalf.”) (footnote omitted). Large chapter 11 reorganizations rarely involve
the appointment of a trustee, so the debtor generally fills this role. See Stephen J.
Lubben, Bankruptcy Venue and the Delaware Solyndra Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19,
2011,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/19/bankruptcy-venue-and-the-delawaresolyndra-ruling/ (defending the rarity of appointing trustees in big chapter 11 cases by
explaining that such appointment often results in conversion to chapter 7, which results
in “basically nothing for [] unsecured creditors”); see In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d
1217, 1225 (3d Cir. 1989) (“It is settled that appointment of a trustee should be the
exception, rather than the rule.”).
94. 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (“[A] debtor in possession shall have all the rights, other than
the right to compensation under section 330 of this title, and powers, and shall perform
all the functions and duties, except the duties specified in sections 1106(a)(2), (3), and
(4) of this title . . . .” ); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9001(11) (“‘Trustee’ includes a debtor in
possession in a [C]hapter 11 case.”). This power, however, is subject to the powers of
any later-appointed trustee or court-prescribed limitations. 11 U.S.C. § 1107.
95. Dynasty Oil & Gas, LLC v. Citizens Bank (In re United Operating, LLC), 540
F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2008); see 11 U.S.C. § 1141(b) (“Except as otherwise provided
in the plan or the order confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan vests all of the
property of the estate in the debtor.”); Compton v. Anderson (In re MPF Holdings US
LLC), 701 F.3d 449, 453 (5th Cir. 2012) (“In general, when a chapter 11 reorganization
plan is confirmed by the bankruptcy court, the debtor losses [sic] its debtor-inpossession status and with it, standing to pursue the estate’s claims.”).
96. MPF Holdings, 701 F.3d at 454 (Debtors have standing after the plan is
confirmed “to bring claims that the debtor reserved in the reorganization plan[,] but
[they] will not have standing to bring claims that were not reserved in the plan.”).
97. Id. at 453.
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trustees have the ability to sue third parties for the benefit of the estate
throughout the duration of a chapter 11 case.98 This power may extend
beyond the confirmation of a plan of reorganization, allowing the trustee
to pursue claims retained in the plan under § 1123(b)(3)(B).99
C. THE TYPES OF CLAIMS WHICH CAN BE RETAINED
Section 1123(b)(3)(B) allows for post-confirmation pursuit and
enforcement of claims when the recovery will benefit the estate and the
debtor has appropriately reserved the cause of action.100 The statutory
language of § 1123(b)(3)(B) explicitly includes all claims and
interests.101 The types of claims potentially retained102 may include: (1)
lender liability,103 (2) malpractice,104 and (3) breach of contract claims.105
Section 1123(b)(3)(B) does not confine claim retention to certain
categories of claims, but rather provides a general means for debtors to

98. 11 U.S.C. § 323. The provision does not contain any durational limitations.
Id.; see also supra note 20.
99. See Syndicate Exch. Corp. v. Duffy (In re Pro Greens, Inc.), 297 B.R. 850, 856
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003) (“A reorganization trustee, post-confirmation, may pursue
claims, including avoidance actions against third parties, on behalf of the estate if the
confirmed plan and order of confirmation so provides.”).
100. COLLIER PAMPHLET PART I, supra note 68, at 898.
101. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B).
102. Whether claim retention is successful or unsuccessful will depend on the
court’s interpretation and application of §1123(b)(3)(B). See infra Part II for a
discussion of the various methods employed by courts.
103. See, e.g., Sanders Confectionery Prods., Inc. v. Heller Fin., Inc., 973 F.2d 474,
482 (6th Cir. 1992); Sure-Snap Corp. v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 948 F.2d 869, 877
(2nd Cir. 1991).
104. See Nat’l Benevolent Ass’n of the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) v.
Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP (In re Nat’l Benevolent Ass’n of the Christian Church
(Disciples of Christ)), 333 F. App’x 822, 827 (5th Cir. 2009).
105. In Envirodyne Industries, Inc. v. Conn. Mutual Life Co. (In re Envirodyne
Industries, Inc.), a breach of contract claim valued at $100 million, that was not
explicitly reserved was under dispute. 174 B.R. 986, 991 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994).
Although the issues could technically have been litigated prior to confirmation,
Envirodyne argued that such litigation was impossible due to the rapid progression of
the bankruptcy proceedings. Id. The court noted that it might have been “better policy”
if an action of such magnitude were disclosed in the disclosure statement, but found that
the failure to reserve the action was not fatal. Id. The court, however, did not reference
section 1123 or any potential reservations in the plan of reorganization, rather it relied
on section 546(a)(1) and the presence of only minimal damage to the defendants due to
the late filing of suit. Id.; see also discussion supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
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provide for the continued maximization of the estate postconfirmation.106
The Code explicitly permits trustees—and thus debtors-inpossession107—to pursue certain claims for the benefit of the estate.108
Section 1123(b)(3)(B) provides a statutory basis under which debtors
and trustees can retain and enforce these claims post-confirmation. 109
The claims retained under § 1123(b)(3)(B) often include avoidance
actions,110 which are explicitly referenced in chapter 5 of the Code.111
Litigating all preference actions prior to plan confirmation may be either
impractical or impossible,112 so avoidance actions involving preferences,
as described in § 547(b), 113 are commonly retained using §

106.
107.

11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B).
Dynasty Oil & Gas, LLC v. Citizens Bank (In re United Operating, LLC), 540
F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2008); see 11 U.S.C. § 1141(b) (“Except as otherwise provided
in the plan or the order confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan vests all of the
property of the estate in the debtor.”); Compton v. Anderson (In re MPF Holdings US
LLC), 701 F.3d 449, 453 (5th Cir. 2012) (“In general, when a chapter 11 reorganization
plan is confirmed by the bankruptcy court, the debtor losses [sic] its debtor-inpossession status and with it, standing to pursue the estate’s claims.”).
108. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
109. § 1123(b)(3)(B) (A plan may provide for “the retention and enforcement by the
debtor, by the trustee, or by a representative of the estate appointed for such purpose, of
any such claim or interest”).
110. For a brief overview of avoidance actions, see John D. Ayer, Michael Bernstein
& Jonathan Friedland, Overview of Avoidance Actions, 23-MAR AM. BANKR. INST. J.
26 (2004).
111. The Code provides explicit limits on avoiding powers, both protecting
vulnerable creditors and potential defendants and providing a reasonable level of
finality and notice. Section 546 prescribes limitations on the time under which an
action may be commenced under sections 544, 545, 547, 548, or 553, along with other
explicit limitations. 11 U.S.C. § 546. Section 551 supports the expansive nature of the
estate provided for under section 541 by automatically preserving any property of the
estate from avoided transfers for the benefit of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 551.
112. Elk Horn Coal Co. v. Conveyor Mfg. & Supply, Inc. (In re Pen Holdings, Inc.),
316 B.R. 495, 498–99 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2004).
113. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). Preference claims, a type of avoidance action, allow a
trustee to recover money, property, or lien rights that were the subject of a preferential
transfer, but the law is strict and a trustee must prove the six elements in section 547(b)
before recovery. Harlin DeWayne Hale & Andrew G. Edson, Preferences in
Bankruptcy Cases, or Do I Really Have to Give the Money Back?, 60-FEB FED. LAW.
66 (2013). Allowing trustees to bring preference claims protects the estate against
preferential treatment of certain creditors, to the detriment of others, where the
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1123(b)(3)(B).114 Plans of reorganization may also seek to retain claims
involving actions under § 548 for the avoidance of fraudulent transfers
and other obligations incurred by the debtor, 115 as well as actions to
recover setoffs under §553(b)(1).116 By allowing for post-confirmation
pursuit of these claims, § 1123(b)(3)(B) broadens the scope of the
powers provided for by chapter 5 of the Code in order to maximize the
estate.117
D. THE TRUSTEE’S POWER TO SETTLE OR ADJUST ESTATE CLAIMS AND
INTERESTS
In addition to the power to retain claims under § 1123(b)(3)(B),
debtors-in-possession and trustees also have the separate ability to adjust
and settle claims. 118 While the fiduciary duties that the debtor-inpossession and the trustee owe to the creditors and shareholders
necessarily limit these abilities,119 both parties have exceptionally broad
discretion in exercising their settlement powers.120
recipients of such transfers receive more than they otherwise might. 11 U.S.C. §
547(b)(5).
114. The impractical nature of litigating all preference actions prior to plan
confirmation necessitates the right of a reorganized debtor to overcome the res judicata
effect of confirmation and reserve the right to bring such actions post confirmation. Pen
Holdings, 316 B.R. at 498–99; see Kmart Corp. v. Intercraft Co. (In re Kmart Corp.),
310 B.R. 107, 119 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004).
115. 11 U.S.C. § 548. Allowing the retention of fraudulent transfer claims enables
the trustee to assist in “avoid[ing] fraud and self-dealing by a debtor at the expense of
the estate’s creditors.” United States v. Sims (In re Feiler), 218 F.3d 948, 955 (9th Cir.
2000).
116. 11 U.S.C. § 553(b)(1); see Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Exxon Co. (In re Braniff
Airways, Inc.), 814 F.2d 1030, 1040 (5th Cir. 1987) (“If section 553(b) is applicable,
pre-petition setoffs within the 90 day period before filing that improve the creditor’s
position can be recovered by the trustee.”).
117. See infra Part II.
118. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019 (“[T]he court may approve a compromise or
settlement. Notice shall be given to creditors, the United States trustee, the debtor, and
indenture trustees as provided in Rule 2002 and to any other entity as the court may
direct.”).
119. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355
(1985).
120. See, e.g., Shaia v. Three Rivers Woods, Inc. (In re Three Rivers Woods, Inc.),
No. 98-38685, 2001 WL 720620, at *5–7 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Mar. 20, 2001). The trustee
brought a motion to compromise a claim in a chapter 7 case, and a hearing was held to
determine whether the settlement was reasonable, as “a compromise or settlement will
most likely gain approval if it is both fair and equitable, as well as representative of the
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Allowing debtors-in-possession and trustees to waive and settle
claims enables them to exercise their judgment for the benefit of the
estate. 121
Claims, including those explicitly retained under §
1123(b)(3)(B), may be settled under § 1123(b)(3)(A). 122 Debtors-inpossession and trustees have broad power to settle matters, and courts
generally defer to their judgment where it conceivably benefits the
estate.123
II. NAVIGATING § 1123(B)(3)(B) TO DETERMINE THE SUFFICIENCY OF
CLAIM RESERVATIONS
While courts vary in their precise interpretations of §
1123(b)(3)(B), a clear split exists as to whether general or categorical,
reservations of claims will suffice, or whether even more express
reservations are required.124 Courts have broad discretion to permit very
general claim reservations in plans of reorganization and disclosure
statements under the broad language of § 1123(b)(3)(B).125 There is no
direct statutory requirement for explicit or individual reservation of
claims in order to pursue such claims post-confirmation.126 Courts must
then rely on wavering standards when determining whether to permit the
retention of claims under particular circumstances, and these
determinations have a lasting impact due to the res judicata effect of
plan confirmation.

best interests of the estate as a whole.” Id. at 6 (internal quotations omitted). A court
has even gone as far as to interpret the permissive language in Rule 9019 to allow a
trustee discretion over whether or not to seek court approval of a settlement. See In re
Dalen, 259 B.R. 586, 598–99 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2001).
121. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
122. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(A)-(B) (2012).
123. See W. HOMER DRAKE, JR. & CHRISTOPHER S. STRICKLAND, CHAPTER 11
REORGANIZATIONS § 12:21 (2d ed., 2012) (explaining that “[a] settlement generally will
be approved if it falls within the zone or range of reasonableness, allows the debtor to
concentrate on running the business, avoids significant expenses and inconvenience of
suit, is otherwise fair and equitable in its terms, and serves the interests of equity
securities holders generally”).
124. Compare discussion Part II.A. with discussion infra Part II.B.
125. See infra Part II.A.
126. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B).
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A. GENERAL “BLANKET” RESERVATIONS IN PLANS OF REORGANIZATION
The most generous view regarding the reservation of claims under
§ 1123(b)(3)(B) allows for blanket reservations. 127 These broad, allencompassing reservations enable debtors to simply reserve all claims,
which may add significant value to the estate by allowing for maximum
claim retention. 128 Allowing blanket reservations of debtors’ right to
pursue claims also expedites the confirmation process. 129 Requiring
debtors to identify and catalogue the specific claims to be retained postconfirmation would require that debtors evaluate all claims filed against
the debtor and the debtor’s estate, in order to decide whether to pursue,
reserve, or abandon any claims prior to starting the process of plan
confirmation. 130 Although blanket reservations relieve debtors of this
burden, courts rarely permit such broad reservations of causes of action
in either the plan or the disclosure statement.131
JP Morgan Trust Co. v. Mid-America Pipeline Co. provides a
prime example of why courts might permit general claim reservations.132
The plan of reorganization granted the trustee “exclusive right to
‘enforce any and all present or future Litigation Claims’ . . . whether
known or unknown, that the Debtors, the Estates, or the Bankruptcy
Committees may hold or assert against any non-Debtor Entity.” 133
Based on this blanket reservation, the trustee sought to retain, for the

127.
128.

See infra Part II.B. for a discussion of alternative views.
See JP Morgan Trust Co. v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 413 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1281
(D. Kan. 2006).
129. Cohen v. TIC Fin. Sys. (In re Ampace Corp.), 279 B.R. 145, 159 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2002) (explaining that requiring debtors to determine all possible actions to be
preserved before confirmation would slow down the reorganization process to the
detriment of both creditors and debtors); see also Amarex Inc. v. Marathon Oil Co. (In
re Amarex, Inc.), 74 B.R. 378, 380 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1987), aff’d, 88 B.R. 362 (W.D.
Okla. 1988) (“. . . §1123(b)(3)(B) serves the useful function of allowing confirmation of
a plan before possible claims against others have been fully investigated and pursued.”).
130. In re Weidel, 208 B.R. 848, 853 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1997) (requiring debtors to
catalog all objections to claims in the plan of reorganization or disclosure statement
“would be lengthy, would seriously delay the proposal of a plan as well as
confirmation, and would eat into the debtor’s exclusivity period”).
131. See discussion infra Part III.B.
132. Mid-Am. Pipeline, 413 F. Supp. 2d. at 1280–81.
133. Id. at 1278. The plan of reorganization further defined ‘Litigation Claims’ as
all “claims, rights, causes of action, defenses, counterclaims, suits or proceedings,
whether in law or in equity.” Id.
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benefit of the estate, a non-bankruptcy claim for the termination of a
lease, valued at potentially $30 million.134
The defendants opposed the reservation of the claim under §
1123(b)(3)(B) as lacking sufficient specificity. 135 They argued that
while general reservations may preserve “garden variety preference or
avoidance action[s],” they should not suffice to reserve a claim of this
magnitude. 136 The court, however, did not find merit in this
distinction. 137 The district court broadly held that the purpose of §
1123(b)(3)(B) is at least partly to provide notice to creditors regarding
potential funds that could increase the estate and thus the distributions to
creditors.138
Blanket reservations, such as the one found in this plan of
reorganization, provide sufficient notice to creditors and defendants
alike. 139 Courts may enforce such broad reservations in order to
promote the maximization of the bankruptcy estate.140 Due to the res
judicata effect of plan confirmation, 141 permitting such broad claims
reservations offers debtors the widest latitude to pursue claims postconfirmation for the benefit of the estate.142
B. SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS IN PLANS OF REORGANIZATION
The majority of courts faced with deciding whether retained claims
may be enforced pursuant to § 1123(b)(3)(B) have found that a more
express reservation of such claims in the plan of reorganization is
required.143 Some of these courts interpret this to require simply that the
debtor disclose categories of claims the debtor intends to retain, while
other courts require disclosure of the particular claims.
134. Id. at 1280–81. The defendants terminated a lease for the use of a pipeline for
transporting natural gas to a refinery owned by the debtor. Id. at 1254.
135. Id. at 1280.
136. Id. at 1280–81.
137. Id. at 1281.
138. Id.
139. See id.
140. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
141. See supra Part I.A.1.
142. See discussion infra Part II.B.
143. Tracar, S.A. v. Silverman (In re Am. Preferred Prescription, Inc.), 266 B.R.
273, 277 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (explaining that a majority of courts have held “the plan must
expressly reserve the right to pursue that particular claim post-confirmation and that a
blanket reservation allowing for an objection to any claim is insufficient”).
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1. Categorical Reservations
No clear standard exists as to what exactly is required to enforce
claims reservations, but many courts find categorical claims reservations
to be sufficient. While not as narrow as individual reservations of
claims, 144 categorical reservations still narrow the scope of allowed
claims by requiring extra foresight from debtors and necessitating more
specificity than blanket claims reservations. 145 Allowing for the
reservation of categories of claims provides notice to those potential
defendants who might want to object to the plan’s reservation prior to
confirmation, 146 while still enabling debtors to maximize the estate
through § 1123(b)(3)(B) claim retention. 147 Categorical reservations
promote bankruptcy’s goal of ensuring that all similarly situated
creditors are treated alike, and they help ensure that recoveries from
retained causes of action serve to benefit creditors, and more specifically
unsecured creditors.148
In In re P.A. Bergner & Co., the Seventh Circuit supported this
balancing of the general goals of bankruptcy with the rights of creditors
and the need to maximize the bankruptcy estate.149 The court held that
144.
145.
146.

See infra Part II.B.2.
See supra Part II.A.
Defendants of claims retained post-confirmation have multiple opportunities to
object to such reservations prior to the binding effect of plan confirmation under section
1141(a). Defendants whom fail to object prior to confirmation are precluded from later
objecting to the enforcement of the causes of action. Cohen v. TIC Fin. Sys. (In re
Ampace Corp.), 279 B.R. 145, 160 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002).
147. Regardless of the stated purpose for allowing categorical reservations of claims
under section 1123(b)(3)(B), courts that do so encourage claims that would otherwise
be abandoned to be included as estate property. See, e.g., Buckley v. Goldman, Sachs
& Co., No. 02- 11497, 2005 WL 1206865 (D. Mass. May 20, 2005) (finding retention
of cause of action permissible where plan language specifically referenced the intent to
retain avoidance actions); Katz v. I.A. Alliance Corp. (In re I. Appel Corp.), 300 B.R.
564, 567–69 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), aff’d, 104 F. App’x 199 (2d Cir. 2004) (allowing the
reservation of claims arising under the Code’s recovery provisions); Temex Energy,
Inc. v. Hastie & Kirschner (In re Amarex, Inc.), 96 B.R. 330, 333 (W.D. Okla. 1989)
(permitting the general reservation of preference and fraudulent transfer actions in the
plan); Texas Consumer Fin. Corp. v. First Nat’l City Bank, 365 F. Supp. 427, 432
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (allowing reservation of preference actions where the plan specifically
retained jurisdiction to pursue such actions).
148. See Retail Mktg. Co. v. King (In re Mako, Inc.), 985 F.2d 1052, 1054–56 (10th
Cir. 1993).
149. P.A. Bergner & Co. v. Bank One, Milwaukee, N.A. (In re P.A. Bergner & Co.),
140 F.3d 1111 (7th Cir. 1998).
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the language of § 1123(b)(3)(B) is sufficiently broad to allow for
categorical reservation of claims, which are express in their
categorization but do not specifically identify individual claims. 150
Here, the debtor commenced adversary proceedings to recover
preferential payments in the amounts of $31,207,000 and $6,358,000.151
The plan of reorganization explicitly retained avoidance and recovery
actions, but it did not specifically identify the claims in question.152
The court held that plans need only retain claims of a given type
and found that the actions were not barred. 153 The court went even
further in emphasizing the importance of recovery to the estate, finding
that the recovery action should be allowed even though it would not
directly benefit creditors, but instead would benefit the reorganized
entity. 154 Bankruptcy courts have subsequently relied on this case to
find categorical reservations of claims sufficient, 155 promoting the
wealth maximization of the estate for the benefit of all stakeholders.
The First and Tenth Circuits have similarly held that categorical
reservations of claims satisfy the requirements of § 1123(b)(3)(B). In In
re Bankvest Capital Corp., the First Circuit expressly chose not to
address whether §§ 1123 and 1141 operated together to give plan
confirmation a res judicata effect, but the court still found that the plan
properly retained the avoidance action at issue.156 The language in the
plan only generally authorized the liquidating supervisor to “investigate,
prosecute and, if necessary, litigate, any Cause of Action,” but the
definition provided for “Cause of Action” expressly included avoidance
actions. 157 The defendant argued that while the plan did reserve
avoidance actions, it did not specifically reserve the avoidance action at
issue.158 The court, however, found the categorical reservation sufficient
to preserve the representative of the bankruptcy estate’s general right to

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 1117.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1118.
See, e.g., Kmart Corp. v. Intercraft Co. (In re Kmart Corp.), 310 B.R. 107, 124
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004).
156. Fleet Nat’l Bank v. Gray (In re Bankvest Capital Corp.), 375 F.3d 51, 59–60
(1st Cir. 2004).
157. Id. at 59.
158. Id. at 60.
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bring avoidance actions. 159 The Tenth Circuit came to the same
conclusion in In re Mako, finding categorical reservations of avoidance
actions sufficient under § 1123(b)(3)(B), indicating to debtors that such
categorical reservations may be sufficient to retain post-petition
claims.160
In finding a general reservation of claims insufficient in Harstad v.
First American Bank, the Eighth Circuit implied that a more express
categorical reservation might have been sufficient. 161
The plan
contained a “Continuing Jurisdiction” provision which provided that the
bankruptcy court would retain jurisdiction over “all causes of actions
[sic] between Debtors and any other party, including but not limited to
any right of Debtors to recover assets pursuant to the provisions of the
Code.”162 The court focused on the lack of sufficient notice to creditors,
affirming the bankruptcy court’s holding that the debtors lacked
standing to pursue a claim due to insufficient reservation in the plan of
reorganization.163 The bankruptcy court focused its holding on the need
for those subject to preference actions to be explicitly aware of this
possibility in the plan in order to confirm the plan properly. 164
Highlighting the language of § 1123(b)(3)(B), the court explained that
retention language must be clear and unequivocal.165 The circuit court
held that debtors should specifically reserve their right to pursue certain
types of claims post-confirmation, as creditors are entitled to know the
debtors’ intention to pursue preference actions.166 Although the court
affirmed the bankruptcy court’s holding, finding the blanket reservation
insufficient, the court did not explain precisely what type of reservation
would be sufficient.167
159.
160.

Id.
Retail Mktg. Co. v. King (In re Mako, Inc.), 985 F.2d 1052, 1056 (10th Cir.
1993) (holding that the reservation of avoidance actions was sufficient to expressly
reserve such a cause of action in the plan of reorganization).
161. Harstad v. First Am. Bank, 39 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 1994).
162. Id. at 902.
163. Id. at 904.
164. Harstad v. First Am. Bank (In re Harstad), 155 B.R. 500, 509–10 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1993), aff’d, No. 4-90-869, 1994 WL 526013 (D. Minn. Jan. 20, 1994), aff’d, 39
F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 1994).
165. Harstad, 155 B.R. at 510. The court reasoned that “Congress specifically said:
If a debtor wants to preserve what would normally be lost, its plan must provide for
such retention. Congress knew how to provide a specific exception. Debtors must
know how to invoke it.” Id.
166. Harstad, 39 F.3d at 903.
167. Id.
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The Fifth Circuit consistently identifies its standard as requiring
“specific and unequivocal” claim reservations,168 however, in practice,
this seems to permit categorical reservations. The Fifth Circuit adopted
this approach in In re United Operating, LLC. 169 The plan of
reorganization in this case broadly retained “any and all claims arising
under the Code,” and it also more expressly reserved certain categories
of claims covered under the Code.170 The court held, however, that
neither of these reservations was sufficient to retain the common-law
claim at issue.171 The court grounded its argument in bankruptcy’s basic
goal of settling all assets and liabilities of a debtor promptly and
effectively.172 The court did not state how unequivocal the reservation
must be to satisfy this heightened standard and permit retention of the
breach of contract claim.173 The court, however, did cite to other cases
finding categorical reservations sufficient. 174 While a specific and
unequivocal standard sounds as if it would necessitate extremely
detailed reservations, categorical reservations might still provide the
debtor standing to pursue those claims owned by the estate prior to plan
confirmation.
The Fifth Circuit subsequently held in In re Texas Wyoming
Drilling, Inc., that where a plan simply reserved “Avoidance Actions
against pre-petition shareholders of TWD,” it specifically and
unequivocally retained the claims.175 The court did not decide whether
individual defendants must be identified. 176 Rather, it found the
reservation, which included a class of prospective defendants,
sufficient. 177 Although this reservation appears to be categorical, it

168. Dynasty Oil & Gas, LLC v. Citizens Bank (In re United Operating, LLC), 540
F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2008).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 356.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 355.
173. Id.
174. Id. It is unclear whether a reservation of “all common-law causes of action”
would have been sufficient, or whether the debtor would have been required to more
specifically retain all breach of contract claims.
175. Spicer v. Laguna Madre Oil & Gas II, LLC (In re Tex. Wyo. Drilling, Inc.),
647 F.3d 547, 552 (5th Cir. 2011).
176. Id.
177. Id.
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provides more by naming a class of defendants.178 It is unclear whether
without this specific identification of defendants, a general reservation
of avoidance actions would have been enforceable.179
Most recently, the Fifth Circuit somewhat clarified the application
of its “specific and unequivocal” standard in In re MPF Holdings US
LLC.180 In reversing the bankruptcy court’s ruling that the reservation
language in the plan was too ambiguous, the court held that plan
language that preserved all avoidance actions, except those individual
actions explicitly abandoned, was sufficiently specific and
unequivocal. 181 The language referenced categories of claims to be
reserved, but it failed to specify any potential defendants.182 While the
court in effect held that claims reservations do not need to name
potential defendants, the decision did not explicitly state this, nor did it
reveal any bright line rule as to what exactly is required to meet the Fifth
Circuit’s “specific and unequivocal” standard.183
Delaying plan confirmation by requiring specific and unequivocal
reservations of individual claims or defendants under § 1123(b)(3)(B)
risks delaying creditors’ recovery or inducing debtors to expedite plan
confirmation by abandoning claims to the detriment of the estate. 184
Categorical reservations indicating the type or category of reserved
claims provide sufficient notice that claims might be pursued post178. Id. The Fifth Circuit did not clearly establish whether claims reservations must
somehow identify potential defendants to satisfy the specific and unequivocal standard.
Compare Moglia v. Keith (In re Manchester, Inc.), Adv. No. 09-3027, No. 08-30703,
2009 WL 2243592 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. July 16, 2009) (finding the reservation “specific
and equivocal” even though it failed to list the names of potential defendants), with In
re MPF Holding US LLC, 443 B.R. 736 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011), rev’d Compton v.
Anderson (In re MPF Holdings US LLC), 701 F.3d 449, 457 (5th Cir. 2012)
(concluding rather that all potential defendants must be individually identified in the
plan).
179. The court did not specifically address this matter in In re Tex. Wyo. Drilling,
Inc., 647 F.3d 547 (5th Cir. 2011).
180. Compton v. Anderson (In re MPF Holdings US LLC), 701 F.3d 449, 457 (5th
Cir. 2012) (holding reservation of claims in plans of reorganization must be sufficiently
specific and unequivocal to be enforced).
181. Id. at 456–57.
182. Id. at 457.
183. In re MPF Holdings US LLC, 701 F.3d 449.
184. Katz v. I.A. Alliance Corp. (In re I. Appel Corp.), 300 B.R. 564, 569 (S.D.N.Y.
2003), aff’d, 104 F. App’x 199 (2d Cir. 2004). Delaying creditors’ recovery and
unnecessarily speeding up the plan confirmation process both undermine the Code’s
purpose of achieving “maximum distribution in the minimum time with all creditors of
the same class sharing ratably.” Id. (citation omitted).
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confirmation. 185 Categorical reservations promote general judicial
deference, and courts approving such claims reservations balance the
need for specificity and finality with the goal of maximizing the
bankruptcy estate for the benefit of both the creditor and debtor.186
2. Reservations of Individual Claims
Courts have also interpreted the res judicata effect of plan
confirmation to require explicit reservations of individual claims. 187
Courts requiring such express reservations set a very high bar on
debtors’ ability to pursue pre-existing claims pursuant to §
1123(b)(3)(B).188 In these cases, where a plan merely contains a general
reservation or categorical reservations of claims, the plan of
reorganization is binding and functions as res judicata, barring a debtor
or trustee from bringing any individual actions which the plan does not
expressly reserve.189
Just one year prior to its decision in In re P.A. Bergner & Co.,190
the Seventh Circuit in effect held, without reference to § 1123, that
reservations of claims in chapter 11 plans must be more specific than
general or categorical reservations.191 In D & K Properties Crystal Lake
v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, the court decided whether a
paragraph in the debtor’s confirmed plan, permitting the disbursing
agent to “enforce all causes of action existing in favor of the Debtor,”
was sufficient to avoid the defense of res judicata and allow the agent to

185. Cohen v. TIC Fin. Sys. (In re Ampace Corp.), 279 B.R. 145, 160 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2002) (allowing for the general reservation of avoidance actions). The court
emphasized that where there is a general reservation of preference or avoidance actions,
those creditors who might be subject to such a reserved claim are properly on notice
that individual claims against them are being reserved. Id. at 161; see also Cooper v.
Tech Data Corp. (In re Bridgeport Holdings, Inc.), 326 B.R. 312, 327 (Bankr. D. Del.
2005).
186. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 190-197.
188. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 190-197.
189. Eric W. Anderson, Can the Disclosure Statement Supplement the Plan to
Preserve Estate Claims?, 30-OCT AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26, 84 (2011).
190. P.A. Bergner & Co. v. Bank One, Milwaukee, N.A. (In re P.A. Bergner & Co.),
140 F.3d 1111, 1117 (7th Cir. 1998).
191. See D & K Props. Crystal Lake v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 112 F.3d 257 (7th Cir.
1997).
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pursue a bad faith breach of contract claim.192 The court held that to
reserve individual claims, the claims must be expressly and specifically
identified in the plan.193 The court focused its holding on the purpose of
finality in a confirmed plan, finding that general reservations function to
reserve nothing.194
Similarly, in In re Kelley, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel emphasized that the policy of the Code prefers the debtor disclose
all potential causes of action in its finding that the claims at issue were
not effectively reserved in the confirmed plan.195 The case involved the
debtor’s potential reservation of counterclaims against claims of
creditors that the debtor had expressly disclosed in its plan.196 While the
plan disclosed the claims of the creditors, there was no explicit
reservation of the counterclaims to permit the debtor to pursue those
causes of action post-confirmation.197 The court held that res judicata
does not apply where a confirmed plan expressly reserves the right to
litigate a specific cause of action post-confirmation. 198 Since, however,
the debtor did not expressly reserve the counterclaims, they could not be
pursued.199
In practice, few courts strictly require explicit reservations of
individual causes of action. Courts, however, may still find debtors and
trustees to be barred from bringing actions that are not individually
reserved pursuant to the broad language of §§ 1123 and 1141.200 In the
absence of any clear standard permitting less exacting claims
reservations, the interpretation of particular claims reservations remains
uncertain.
C. RESERVATIONS IN DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS
The Bankruptcy Code and Rules provide for the filing of a
disclosure statement to supplement the plan of reorganization, unless the
192.
193.

Id. at 260.
Id. at 261. The court favorably cited In re Kelley, which required individual
claims be identified in order to be retained. Id. at 261; see also Kelley v. S. Bay Bank
(In re Kelley), 199 B.R. 698, 703–04 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996).
194. D & K Props., 112 F.3d at 261.
195. Kelley, 199 B.R. at 703.
196. Id. at 704.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 190-197.
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debtor intends the plan itself to provide adequate information.201 Under
§ 1125(a)(1), the disclosure statement should provide such adequate
information as is required for an investor to make an informed judgment
regarding the plan. 202 Debtors may choose to reserve claims in their
disclosure statements, regardless of whether they are also reserved in the
plan, but it is unclear whether these reservations will be enforceable
under § 1123(b)(3)(B).203
Where a plan of reorganization does not provide sufficient grounds
for supporting the enforcement of post-confirmation causes of action,
courts may look to the disclosure statement to determine whether to
permit claim retention.204 Courts differ in their view as to whether such
reservation in a disclosure statement is necessary or sufficient,205 and
accordingly in the specificity required in order for such reservations to
be enforceable.206 Ultimately, the language in § 1123(b)(3)(B) neither
explicitly nor implicitly addresses whether claims may also be preserved
in the disclosure statement nor the level of specificity which would be
required.207
The Sixth Circuit addressed the potential inclusion of claims
reservations in a disclosure statement in Browning v. Levy. 208 In
201. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3016:
In a chapter . . . 11 case, a disclosure statement under § 1125 of the Code or evidence
showing compliance with § 1126(b) shall be filed with the plan or within a time fixed
by the court, unless the plan is intended to provide adequate information under §
1125(f)(1). If the plan is intended to provide adequate information under § 1125(f)(1),
it shall be so designated and Rule 3017.1 shall apply as if the plan is a disclosure
statement.
202. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012).
203. See, e.g., Browning v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761 (6th Cir. 2002).
204. Spicer v. Laguna Madre Oil & Gas II, LLC (In re Tex. Wyo. Drilling, Inc.),

647 F.3d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[C]ourts routinely consult the disclosure statement
in deciding whether res judicata and judicial estoppel apply.”).
205. In In re Kelley, the court held that that “if the debtor fails to mention the cause
of action in either his schedules, disclosure statement, or plan, then he will be precluded
from asserting it post-confirmation.” 199 B.R. 698, 704 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996). By
using the word either, the court again implies that if sufficient, a claims reservation in a
disclosure statement might be acceptable, even in the absence of such a reservation in
the plan of reorganization.
206. See, e.g., Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc. v. Coolbrands Int’l, Inc. (In re Ice Cream
Liquidation, Inc.), 319 B.R. 324 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2005); Browning, 283 F.3d 761.
207. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B); see also Spicer v. Laguna Madre Oil & Gas II, LLC
(In re Tex. Wyo. Drilling, Inc.), 647 F.3d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 2011).
208. Browning, 283 F.3d at 774.
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Browning, the plan of reorganization failed to reserve the claim at issue;
however, the disclosure statement provided for a blanket reservation of
rights.209 The court broadly held that a general reservation of rights in a
disclosure statement is not sufficient to avoid the res judicata effect of
plan confirmation. 210 The court left open the possibility that a more
express reservation in the disclosure statement, despite no reservation in
the plan, might be sufficient to allow for the enforcement of reserved
claims.211
Furthermore, where a plan does not retain post-confirmation
claims, courts may permit claim retention in the disclosure statement to
supplement the plan. For instance, in In re Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc.,
the court found that a disclosure statement can sufficiently put creditors
on notice regarding potential post-confirmation preference actions. 212
Denying a debtor the ability to pursue claims properly retained in the
disclosure statement, but not in the plan, serves only to provide a
windfall to the potential defendants at the expense of both the debtor and
the creditors.213
Claim reservations included in disclosure statements may also serve
to cure insufficient reservations in plans. While, as a general matter, the
Fifth Circuit requires specific and unequivocal reservations of claims to
permit retention, 214 it has allowed the disclosure statement to provide
such reservation. 215 In In re Texas Wyoming Drilling, Inc., the Fifth
Circuit held that where the plan generally reserved avoidance actions
and the disclosure statement further reserved the right to retain
avoidance actions against specified prospective defendants, the specific
and unequivocal standard was met. 216 The disclosure statement may
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id.
Id.
See id.
Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc. v. Coolbrands Int’l, Inc. (In re Ice Cream
Liquidation, Inc.), 319 B.R. 324, 337 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2005).
213. Appeal of SWR, Inc., 12-1 BCA P 34988 (A.S.B.C.A.), ASBCA No. 56708,
2012 WL 1075711, at *6–7 (Armed Services Bd. Of Contract Appeals Mar. 19, 2012).
214. See supra notes 168-183 and accompanying text. Though, as previously
discussed, it is unclear precisely what “specific and unequivocal” requires.
215. Spicer v. Laguna Madre Oil & Gas II, LLC (In re Tex. Wyo. Drilling, Inc.),
647 F.3d 547 (5th Cir. 2011).
216. Id. at 552. The court in Goldin Assocs., L.L.C. v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette
Securities Corp. held that a debtor’s general reservation of claims in the plan of
reorganization should be read in conjunction with the disclosure statement. No. 008688, 2004 WL 1119652, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2004). Thus, a more specific
reservation of claims in the disclosure statement may permit pursuing such actions,
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thus supplement the plan to provide added specificity and adequate
information to creditors.
While apparent that the language in § 1123(b)(3)(B) provides
minimal guidance as to what is required to properly reserve claims in a
plan of reorganization, 217 the language does explicitly confine claim
reservations to those made within the plan. 218 Section 1123(b)(3)(B)
provides that a plan may provide for the retention of claims, but
nowhere in its language does it reference the ability to retain claims in
disclosure statements.219 Still, courts may look to disclosure statements
to cure insufficient reservations of claims in the plan, or more broadly,
to support such reservation where the plan entirely lacks any
reservation.
III. STANDARDIZING THE APPROACH TO ANALYZING POSTCONFIRMATION CLAIM RETENTION
Plan confirmation effectively releases claims, having a res judicata
effect in chapter 11, in the absence of the exception provided for by §
1123(b)(3)(B).220 The current standard, or lack thereof, for determining
whether or not claims may be retained post confirmation leaves
bankruptcy courts largely on their own to determine what standard to
apply,221 and practitioners are left to guess as to how much specificity is
sufficient when drafting plans of reorganization. 222 Without a clear
standard, plan proponents risk abandoning claims and estate property

where an otherwise insufficient blanket reservation in the plan would not. Basic
contract law also supports reading and interpreting the disclosure statement and the plan
as a whole, considering their unified execution and intertwined subject matter. See
Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, Inc. v. Pitterich, 805 F.2d 96, 107 (3d Cir. 1986).
217. See supra Part II.
218. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123.
219. 11 U.S.C. § 1123; see also Tex. Wyo. Drilling, 647 F.3d at 551 (“§
1123(b)(3)(B) does not explicitly or implicitly address whether claims may also be
preserved in the disclosure statement.”). Only in rare cases, where a literal
interpretation would forsake the drafters’ intent, should courts step outside of the plain
meaning of statutes. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242
(1989).
220. See supra Part I.A.
221. See Envirodyne Indus., Inc. v. Conn. Mut. Life Co. (In re Envirodyne Indus.,
Inc.), 174 B.R. 986 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994).
222. See supra Part II.B.
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depending both on the specificity in the drafting of their plan documents
and the standard applied by the court in evaluating them.223
A. THE ROLE OF § 1123(B)(3)(B) IN MAXIMIZING ESTATE VALUE
As debtors increasingly use chapter 11 as a tool to financially
restructure companies, it also comes under criticisms for the low returns
received by unsecured creditors. 224
Claim retention under §
1123(b)(3)(B) provides a means to enhance the scope of the bankruptcy
estate and potentially increase the distributions to creditors. 225
Maximizing the estate for the general benefit of creditors supports a
broad allowance of retained claims, which categorical reservations in the
plan of reorganization provide.226 Since plan confirmation is the goal of
chapter 11 cases,227 enabling creditors to rely on such broad reservations
has the potential to encourage creditors to approve plans where
outstanding causes of action belonging to the debtor might increase the
potential distributions.228
The Code explicitly provides for an expansive estate after debtors
file an order for relief under chapter 11.229 While the language of §
1123(b)(3)(B) fails to provide an explicit standard for determining the
permissiveness of retained claims, 230 other parts of § 1123 aid in its
interpretation. As a general matter, § 1123(b)’s provisions are subject to
subsection (a)’s provisions. 231 Section 1123(a)(5)(A), in particular,
provides that “a plan shall provide adequate means for the plan’s
implementation, such as retention by the debtor of all or any part of the

223.
224.

See supra Part II.B-C.
Theodore Eisenberg & Stefan Sundgren, Is Chapter 11 Too Favorable to
Debtors? Evidence from Abroad, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1532, 1533 (1997).
225. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. When creditors evaluate a plan of
reorganization, prior to voting on it, they analyze the potential distributions it provides.
226. See supra Part II.B.1.
227. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 132-134 and accompanying text. The ability to rely on broad
reservations enables debtors to confirm plans of reorganization without the fear of
abandoning potentially large claims, and subsequently diminishing their relative
distributions.
229. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
230. See supra Part II.
231. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b) (2012); see also Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896
(1984) (“Where, as here, resolution of a question of federal law turns on a statute and
the intention of Congress, we look first to the statutory language.”).
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property of the estate.”232 Under § 541, claims of the debtor are property
of the bankruptcy estate,233 and thus they should generally be retained
by the debtor for the purposes of applying § 1123(b)(3)(B). Considering
that there is no explicit requirement that debtors retain causes of action
for the benefit of the estate, 234 and because the language of §
1123(b)(3)(B) is susceptible to a reading permitting broad
reservations,235 courts should interpret the provision within the general
policies of bankruptcy.236
B. INTERPRETING THE LANGUAGE OF § 1123(B)(3)(B) TO BROADEN THE
ESTATE
The permissive language of § 1123(b)(3)(B) provides that debtors
may reserve causes of action.237 Encouraging a broad interpretation of
the language of § 1123(b)(3)(B) advances the goal of the bankruptcy
code to protect creditors.238 Further, it promotes the maximization of
the bankruptcy estate by easing the burden on plan proponents in
drafting enforceable statements of claim retention in their plan
documents.239 The language of § 1123(b)(3)(B) should be read broadly
to support the maximum possible bankruptcy estate for the benefit of
both creditors and debtors.240
While blanket reservations of all outstanding claims do support the
maximization of the bankruptcy estate, 241 they provide insufficient
notice, allowing debtors to retain any and all potential claims postconfirmation with mere boilerplate language. 242 Courts frequently
address the sufficiency of notice in determining whether claims
reservations are enforceable.243 Where res judicata is implicated, notice
232.
233.
234.

11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(A).
See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
Section 1123(b)(3)(B) is written in permissive terms, using may as opposed to
shall. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B).
235. See supra Part II.A.
236. See supra notes 14-25 and accompanying text.
237. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B).
238. See infra note 266.
239. See supra notes 129-130 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
241. JP Morgan Trust Co. v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 413 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1281 (D.
Kan. 2006).
242. See supra Part I.A.
243. See supra notes 75-81.
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provides an important judicial function.244 General blanket reservations
fail to meet minimal standards of providing notice to potential
defendants, considering the finality that § 1141 is intended to provide
upon the confirmation of a plan of reorganization. 245 Case law,
however, provides little guidance beyond the fact that courts generally
find blanket reservations impermissible under § 1123(b)(3)(B).246
1. Categorically Avoiding Unnecessary Specificity
Courts should adopt a more uniform, stringent requirement that
debtors can rely on in drafting plan documents. Courts, however, should
not go as far as requiring the cataloguing of individual claims or
potential defendants to permit claim retention in a plan of
reorganization, as it is ultimately unnecessary and may be prejudicial to
the estate.247 Requirements that plans reserve claims with “specific and
unequivocal” language leaves open the possibility that courts will
require more than simple categorical claim reservations. 248 The
requirement that claim reservations be “specific and unequivocal”
merely replaces an ambiguous statute, open to varying interpretations,
with a slightly less ambiguous standard.249 Allowing general categorical
reservations, however, provides reasonable notice to creditors, while

244.
245.
246.
247.

See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part II.A.
Prior to the enactment of The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”), debtors were able to obtain nearly endless
extensions of their exclusivity period “for cause” under section 1121 to file a plan of
reorganization. See Jeffrey M. Schlerf, BAPCPA’s Impact on Exclusivity Is Hard to
Gauge, TURNAROUND MGMT. ASSOC. (July 1, 2007), http://www.turnaround.org/
Publications/Articles.aspx?objectID=7797. The lack of limits on debtors’ exclusivity
period was criticized for resulting in unnecessary delays, and giving the debtors undue
bargaining leverage to force, otherwise unwilling, creditors to settle. Id. Debtors’
virtually unrestricted ability to obtain extensions to file a plan did, however, provides
debtors with the extensive time it might require to catalogue every single claim
intended to be retained under § 1123(b)(3)(B). BAPCA limited this ability by fixing
the debtor’s exclusivity period at 120 days under § 1121(b), with only the possibility of
an extension up to 18 months with court approval. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b)-(d); see also
Paolo Manganelli, The Evolution of the Italian and U.S. Bankruptcy Systems–A
Comparative Analysis, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 237, 254 (2010).
248. See supra notes 177-179 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 171-173 and accompanying text.
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also providing debtors reasonable guidelines under which to draft plans
of reorganization.250
Allowing broad categorical reservations permits courts to take into
account and balance the role of reserved claims against the need for
finality upon plan confirmation. 251 The context of the reservation at
issue should be examined to determine whether the particular
reservation sufficiently reveals the potential assets available for
distribution to creditors.252 Courts are more than capable of determining
whether a given claim fits into a certain category of reservations. 253
Where a debtor, for instance, retains all avoidance actions, courts can
properly infer that the debtor intended to retain preference actions.254
Additionally, holders of claims within those retained categories, and
other interested parties, receive sufficient notice that plan confirmation
will not alter the debtors’ pre-existing right to enforce those causes of
action.255
Moreover, regardless of whether courts permit claims to be retained
under § 1123(b)(3)(B), other laws governing the claims will still apply
to protect prospective defendants.
The Code contains implicit
protections for the causes of action that debtors frequently seek to retain
post-confirmation. 256 Where a debtor generally retains avoidance
actions, such as preference, fraudulent conveyance, or set-off actions,
those sections’ stringent requirements must still be met.257 Furthermore,
where retained claims are for causes of action outside of bankruptcy,
such as personal injury or breach of contract claims, other defenses
such as statute of limitations and the statute of frauds will still apply.258

250.
251.
252.

See supra notes 146-147 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.1.
See Elk Horn Coal Co. v. Conveyor Mfg. & Supply, Inc. (In re Pen Holdings,
Inc.), 316 B.R. 495, 504 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2004).
253. See supra Part II.B.1. Where a debtor categorically retains “all avoidance
actions,” courts can conclude that the debtor intended to retain preference actions.
Similarly, where a debtor retains “all contract actions,” courts can reasonably infer that
the debtor intended to retain causes of action for breach of contract.
254. See supra notes 149-153.
255. See supra note 75.
256. See supra note 111.
257. See, e.g., supra note 113.
258. Section 558 of the Code reserves to the debtor all defenses available outside
bankruptcy law. 11 U.S.C. § 558 (2012). As a matter of equity, defendants of claims
brought by the debtor would not be barred from asserting appropriate defenses.
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As such, specific and unequivocal reservations of these claims, beyond
mere categorical reservations, are unnecessary.
2. Compromising Finality with Claim Retention
In order for the confirmation of a plan of reorganization to
compromise a claim, the court must determine that it is both fair and
equitable to the estate. 259 Under Federal Bankruptcy Rule 9019, for
either a compromise or even a settlement of a claim to be approved, the
court must authorize it after notice and hearing. 260 Debtors-inpossession and trustees even have broad discretion under the business
judgment rule and fair and equitable standards to waive or release
claims contained in a plan where it is in the best interest of the estate.261
Since the rights of creditors may also be harmed by denying claim
retention under § 1123(b)(3)(B), 262 courts should have to determine
whether abandoning a claim for being improperly retained under §
1123(b)(3)(B) is fair and equitable. 263 Considering the individual
treatment that compromises, settlements, and waivers of claims receive,
it is both reasonable and manageable for claims retained categorically
under § 1123(b)(3)(B) to receive similar treatment.264
Ultimately, allowing potentially significant claims to be disposed of
because they were not sufficiently retained in the plan of reorganization
betrays basic principles of the Code, and it denies creditors the right to
seek the maximization of the estate through the enforcement of pre-

259. In this determination, the court considers the: “(a) probability of success in
litigation; (b) difficulties, if any, to be encountered in matter of collection; (c)
complexity of litigation involved, and expense, inconvenience, and delay necessarily
attending it; and (d) paramount interest of creditors and proper deference to their
reasonable views.” BANKRUPTCY SERVICE, LAWYERS EDITION § 44:158; JPMorgan
Chase Bank v. Charter Commc’ns Operating LLC (In re Charter Commc’ns), 419 B.R.
221, 257 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Courts look to whether releases are in the estate’s
best interest, as well as the role they play in the Plan and the value the Plan brings to the
estate.”).
260. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019.
261. See U.S. Bank. Nat’l Assoc. v. Wilmington Trust Co. (In re Spansion, Inc.),
426 B.R. 114 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010).
262. See infra Part I.A.
263. See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text. If courts can make
determinations of fairness and equitability in these scenarios, it seems reasonable they
make them when deciding whether or not claims have been properly reserved.
264. See infra Part I.C.
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existing claims post-confirmation. 265 The concept of the “creditor’s
bargain heuristic” has been advanced to promote the concept that
bankruptcy should neither increase nor decrease those rights creditors
would have bargained for pre-petition. 266 Overly restrictive claims
reservations requirements may delay plan formation and confirmation
by increasing the litigation prior to confirmation, subsequently reducing
creditor recoveries. 267 Permitting broad claim retention under §
1123(b)(3)(B) supports a creditor-friendly approach to chapter 11
reorganizations.268 Those creditors with legitimate claims against them
are not losing the benefit of their bargain by having these claims
enforced,269 and the bankruptcy estate as a whole benefits through the
maximization of estate property.270
Debtor corporations use chapter 11 to reorganize as going concerns,
generating the income necessary to pay pre-petition creditors.271 Having
access to as large a pool of funds as possible when attempting to
generally satisfy obligations to creditors greatly benefits debtors while
reorganizing. 272 Foreclosing potentially retained claims by requiring
265. Elk Horn Coal Co. v. Conveyor Mfg. & Supply, Inc. (In re Pen Holdings, Inc.),
316 B.R. 495, 504 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2004) (“§ 1123(b)(3) protects the estate from
loss of potential assets. It is not designed to protect defendants from unexpected
lawsuits.”). Although some of these claims may be against creditors with active claims,
in the form of avoidance actions, this does not negate the need to actively pursue all
monies owed to the debtor in favor of the creditors as a class.
266. WARREN, supra note 6, at 13. Scholars have gone as far as to argue that
creditor protection is the exclusive rationale for bankruptcy. See id.; see also Robert E.
Scott, Through Bankruptcy With the Creditors’ Bargain Heuristic, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
690, 694 (1986) (“The central premise underlying the creditors’ bargain vision is that
bankruptcy is a foreseeable risk that can be (and is) borne individually by the various
claimants of any business enterprise, including secured and unsecured creditors,
shareholders, and managers.”).
267. Michael H. Goldstein, Res Judicata Strikes Twice, 21-OCT AM. BANKR. INST.
J. 16, 41 (2002).
268. DENNIS J. CONNOLLY, DAVID A. LANDER, & TIMOTHY M. LUPINACCI, 2012
NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW SEMINAR MATERIALS: PREFERENCE LITIGATION 81 (2012),
available at http://www.nortoninstitutes.org/2012SeminarMaterials/12-Preference
Litigation/M12-PreferenceLitigationTOC.html.
269. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
271. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. PSS S.S. Co. (In re Prudential Lines
Inc.), 928 F.2d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 1991).
272. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text, see also Chapter 11:
Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Code, UNITED STATES COURTS, available at
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explicit designations of such claims risks diminishing the size of the
estate, 273 thereby reducing the funds available for distribution to
creditors. 274 Permitting broad categorical claim retention under §
1123(b)(3)(B) rather serves to benefit both the debtor and the creditors
as a whole by allowing for a more efficient plan confirmation.275
CONCLUSION
The language of § 1123(b)(3)(B) provides minimal guidance
regarding the level of specificity required in order to retain claims post
confirmation, through either the plan of reorganization or disclosure
statement. Case law similarly fails to provide a clear standard or
consistent guidance as to how to determine whether debtors sufficiently
retain claims. Even those courts purporting to apply a certain standard
vary in their application of those standards and their justifications for so
applying them.
While the majority of courts require more than a blanket
reservation of claims, there does not exist a uniform standard for
applying § 1123(b)(3)(B). Courts should adopt a uniform standard—
one that permits broad categorical reservations. Then, retained claims
can be individually addressed to determine whether they fit
appropriately within the categories of claims retained by the debtor. In
the absence of such a standard, debtors are left unsure as to the
specificity required in their chapter 11 filings, and potential defendants
may or may not be on notice of those causes of action which may be
brought against them.

http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter11.aspx
(“After the plan is confirmed, the debtor is required to make plan payments and is
bound by the provisions of the plan of reorganization.”).
273. See supra notes 132-138 and accompanying text. Failing to permit the
retention of the claim at issue would have greatly diminished the size of the estate and
the funds available for distribution.
274. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.

